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dels. He shows analytically that if quantities to be assessed (e.g., an
estimate of a probability) are decomposed so that the assessor can make
a series of part judgments that are subsequently aggregated by a for­
mula, there are many circumstances in which this leads to better-in the
sense of more reliable-judgments. To do this, Kleinmuntz exploits an
approach developed in psychometrics for decomposing judgments into
"tru�" and "error" components and takes advantage of aggregation to
ehmmate �an_
d
_
om error. The insights provided by Kleinmuntz's chapter
are m del1m1tmg the conditions under which decomposition of judg­
ments leads_ to more reliable judgments and in suggesting what levels of
decompos1t10n and aggregation might be appropriate.
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A societal decision maker (SDM) is a person who makes risky decisions on 
behalf of others. Most of the time, such decisions should be based on the 
wishes and beliefs of the affected people. This chapter explores a few cases in 
which it could be argued that the SDM, in making the decision, should in 
good conscience disregard the desires or beliefs of the affected people. Sev­
eral simplifying assumptions are made: the SDM uses decision analysis in 
making the decision; the affected people speak with one voice on the matter 
under dispute; the SDM and the people disagree on an issue vital to the de­
cision problem; the SDM cannot delay the decision or otherwise avoid the 
disagreement; the SDM is motivated only to make the right decision; and 
the SDM can effectuate an unpopular decision. In this context, the following 
dilemmas are discussed. What il the people object to the use of decision analy­
sis? What if the people reject the axioms of decision analysis? What risk 
attitude should the SDM adopt? What concerns should be included in the 
analysis? What if people are misinformed? What if individual and societal 
perspectives differ? Do people really want what they say they want? For some 
of these questions, we argue that the SDM should make decisions against the 
wishes of the people; for others, we are not sure how to resolve the dispute. 
CoNSIDER THE PERSON whose job it is to make risky decisions on behalf of
others; that is, decisions with outcomes affecting other people, perhaps many 
other people, to a far greater degree than the outcomes affect the decision 
maker. We call such a person a societal decision maker, or SDM. Our society 
has many such people, making decisions about energy options, drug-testing 
standards, genetic research, automobile emissions, and the like. Such prob­
lems are challenging social issues because the stakes are high and the value 
issues complicated. 
In seeking assistance for these complex problems, it is natural that SDMs 
would turn to research in decision making for assistance. As people who earn 
our living by producing and disseminating research results, we would hardly 
want things to be otherwise. 
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There is a rich collection of advice available. Over the past several decades, 
research on decision making has developed a considerable body of knowledge 
about how risky decisions are made and how they can be improved (e.g., 
Kahneman, Slavic, and Tversky 1982; Slavic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff 
1988). Although studies from many disciplines have made important con­
tributions to the topic, in this chapter we focus on contributions from the 
psychological study of decision making and risk perception. Research in be­
havioral decision theory examines how individuals and groups actually do 
make decisions, in contrast to normative prescriptions about how such deci­
sions ought to be made (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Slavic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein 1977). Studies of public perceptions of risk examine people's ex­
pressed opinions about hazardous activities or technologies and attempt to de­
termine how information about uncertain outcomes should be communicated 
among decision makers, Jay people, and technical experts (Slavic 1987). 
We have long argued (Fischhoff et al. 1981), and still believe, that pol­
icymakers need to take account of public values and perceptions in societal 
decisions about risk. Failure to do so entails several dangers. 
First, the people may know something that the experts are missing. For 
example, one finding from risk-perception studies (Slavic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein 1979) is that experts tend to assess the risks of a technological 
option in terms of its expected fatalities and injuries whereas lay people typi­
cally use a broader evaluation scheme that includes the voluntariness of ex­
posure to a risk, the degree to which it is understood scientifically, and a 
number of other psychological factors. It is not hard to argue that such richer, 
more comprehensive views express important criteria that should be included 
in the decision process. 
Second, the disregard of public opinion may result in a decision that cannot 
be implemented because of outspoken public opposition. Even if it is possible 
to force the decision on an unwilling public, the outcomes may be quite differ­
ent from, and worse than, anticipated. Did politicians in 1917 predict that the 
adoption of the Prohibition amendment to the U.S. Constitution would lead to 
a law enforcement crisis and the rise of a wealthy, well-armed, and organized 
underworld? 
Finally, the SDM courts trouble in saying, "I know better than you," and, 
"I'm doing it for your own good." We resented such claims made by our par­
ents when we were young; as adults, we resent them even more. Our society is 
structured, by and large, democratically; we would not willingly live under 
authoritarian rule, even the benevolent regime of a technological elite. 
But when SDMs look to the research literature for guidance in representing 
the public's wishes in their decisions, another danger emerges. Experimental 
results, naively applied to complex social issues, may result in poor social 
decisions. In order to know which of the experimental findings are relevant, 
and when, and under what conditions, SDMs need to ask probing questions of 
the findings and their interpretation. For example, it is important to know why 
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the public and experts view risks differently. Surely the policy implications 
are different if the public is misinformed about the facts than if the experts are 
defining the problem too narrowly. 
Thus, our starting point is that incorporating public input will usually lead 
to better social decisions regarding risk, but we do not believe that this happy 
outcome is guaranteed. We will try, in this chapter, to suggest when and why 
SDMs might, in good conscience, go against public opinion in order to make 
a better social decision. 
This is a chapter about "oughts" and "shoulds," about ethical dilemmas. 
We find ourselves with more opinions than skills as ethicists. We present our 
views forcefully here in the hope that others, whether agreeing or disagreeing 
with us, will be moved to contribute to ongoing discussions about the proper 
role of public input; we believe that these issues contain strong implications 
for the management of risks in our society. We warmly dedicate this chapter 
to the memory of Hillel Einhorn, who we believe would have approved of our 
attempts while arguing with us heartily. 
SETTING THE STAGE 
Our prototypical decision maker is a regulator who forms one link in a 
chain of command but whose opinions play a decisive role in the regulatory 
process. Such people do not stand alone in the world of s�cial dilem�as, 
forced to approach each decision with only their natural instmcts and ethic�.
Instead we assume that the SDM will use what has been learned about deci­
sion m�king, as an aid to structuring the decision problem and a� a gu
i�e to
evaluating social needs and the probable consequences of alternative act�o�s. 
Although a range of prescriptive approaches is available to the dec�s10n 
maker we advocate the use of decision analysis. Our reasons are stra1ght­
forwa:d. First, decision analysis is explicit about its assumptions. It makes 
clear what is being done and what could be done differently. Second, at_ its 
core is subjective expected utility theory, with all its prescriptiv� power. Thir�, 
the multiplicity of objectives and consequences that charactenze many deci­
sion problems can be incorporated into the decision-analytic framework_- Un­
like cost-benefit analysis, in which economic attributes so often dommate, 
decision analysis can fuse "hard, objective" knowledge with "soft, subj�c­
tive" knowledge and values, thereby encouraging the richest, most responsive 
characterization of problems. 
Our view of the efficacy of decision analysis is perhaps broader than that of 
authors who see the technique as a tool to help express and organize one's 
already well-formed beliefs and preferences. In contrast, we suspect that in 
many situations beliefs and preferences are vague, ill formed, or even non­
existent (Fischhoff, Slavic, and Lichtenstein 1980). In working through a de­
cision analysis, then, a user may be not reporting but actually creating beliefs 
and preferences. This process produces a better understanding of the problem 
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and may lead to new insights. Ideally, when the decision analysis is finished, 
the right decision seems obvious. The entire decision analysis then provides 
an elaborate justification for the decision. 
Decision analysis is, we believe, the best method for making complex deci­
sions. But it is not perfect; it cannot be expected to capture every possible 
aspect of the problem and resolve all issues. Thus, one could complete an 
analysis and then decide to go against its prescriptions. We do not know the 
conditions under which this might occur. If it does occur, one at least can feel 
comforted that the decision analysis has illuminated the issues and provided a 
fuller understanding of the situation. 
We recognize that, particularly in the context of the broadly based social 
problems with which we are concerned, it is not always true that one single 
individual has sole decision-making power. But this does not materially affect 
the nature of the dilemmas we address. We therefore assume such sole au­
thority. If, instead, decisions are made in a group (e.g., by a national parlia­
ment or by the three-member U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), the 
reader can suppose that the others' opinions are evenly split and that one per­
son holds the deciding vote. Of course, elected representatives such as mem­
bers of the U.S. Congress face a more complicated situation in which current 
decisions (votes) need to be played off against the desire to ensure future 
coalitions, protect the good of the political party, and so forth. Nevertheless, a 
basic characteristic of such decision environments is that individuals are ex­
pected to act on behalf of, and for the good of, others. 
As a further simplification, we here assume that all members of the af­
fected public agree with one another with regard to the critical aspects of the 
problem under consideration. This is a useful dodge because it means we can 
use terms like the public as if there were only a single public (and we will say 
the experts as if this group, too, were undivided). However, as anyone with 
experience in public participation or communication knows, the public rarely 
speaks with one voice; a key to successful interaction is to identify and under­
stand some of the major distinctions that mark the central actors or stake­
holder groups (see Edwards and von Winterfeldt 1987). This is an important 
topic but one that will not be discussed in this chapter. 
Furthermore, we assume that the SDM and the affected group disagree on 
an issue vital to the decision problem. Thus, for whatever reason, what the 
affected group says it wants is not the same as what the SDM wants or believes 
or thinks is right. Moreover, the disagreement is consequential. Showing, via 
sensitivity analysis, that the disagreement would not materially affect the de­
cision would let our SDM off the hook; we thus exclude this possibility. 
Let us continue to press our SDM by taking away other possibilities that 
might forestall the decision or enable the SDM to avoid squarely facing the 
problem at hand. We do this not because these possibilities are unrealistic but 
because they provide convenient excuses to ignore the dilemmas that we want 
to address. We list four such "outs" that we will not permit. 
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1. The SDM cannot plead limited resources or limited knowledge and just
wait until more or better information comes in. At any rate, there is no reason
to believe that more resources or knowledge would necessarily bring about
agreement between the SDM and the affected group.
2. The SDM is not motivated by other personal or cultural factors such as,
"If I decide that way I'll lose my job," or, "Everyone else in my position has
always done it this way." Instead, we assume that the entire motivation for the
SDM is to make the right decision. 
3. The SDM is able to go against the wishes of the affected public without
producing so much objection that the goal of the decision is itself threatened
or ruined. Clearly, if this were not true, the SDM should take the objections
into account. More interesting, to us, is the question of what SDMs should do
when it is possible to implement an unpopular decision.
4. The SDM cannot automatically justify a course of action by simply
going along with the desires of the affected group. We consider this a fink out
of the lowest order. Without the urgency of a central conflict between the
group and the SDM, there is probably no need for the decision maker at all
and certainly no need for this chapter. 
At this point, we have a competent SDM who is responsible for making an
important decision using decision analysis; the SDM faces a major dilemma
involving a discrepancy between the unanimous wishes of the affected group
and the beliefs of the decision maker (or, as often happens, the advice of the
experts). We turn now to consider several such dilemmas.
DILEMMAS OF THE SDM
What If People Object to the Use of Decision Analysis?
People may oppose decision analysis because they believe that formal
structuring and the codification of values as numbers can never capture the
intuitive essence of a complex problem. We reject this view and urge our
SDM to reject it. Although a decision analysis can never be complete, the
process of constructing it forces the decision maker to think about the problem
in an orderly way, which is a virtue for any difficult decision.
People may also object to decision analysis because it calls for explicit
trade-offs between attributes such as lives and money (MacGregor and Slovic
1986). They may object to such trade-offs because they believe that the gov­
ernment has deep pockets ("Spend whatever money it takes to save the lives")
or because they find such trade-offs morally repugnant. For this dilemma, we
have firm advice for the SDM. Go against the public's wishes. We believe that
social decisions are made under real resource constraints, that such con­
straints tacitly imply trade-offs, and that it is better to make the trade-offs ex­
plicit. Decision analysis did not invent these trade-offs; if both the approach
and its advocates were to vanish tomorrow, the trade-offs would still remain.
This is quite a strong position. However, we declare an even stronger one.
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Because awkward trade-offs (between lives and dollars, pollution and jobs, or 
the safety of the old and the young) are both so prevalent and so difficult to 
face, it is the responsibility of the SDM to make them explicit and point them
out to the public. Being attentive to public opinion does not require fooling 
people into thinking that tough decisions need not be made. 
What If People Reject the Axioms? 
There is plenty of evidence in the research literature showing that util­
ity theory is not a good descriptive theory. Some of its descriptive failures 
may be traced, directly (e.g., Tversky 1969) or indirectly (e.g., Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1983), to violations of one or more axioms. One response to 
these findings, currently much in vogue, is to invent new versions of utility 
theory that omit the offending axiom in an effort to make utility theory more 
descriptively accurate (see Machina 1987). Although we admire much of this 
work for its creativity, we are not convinced that our SDMs should adopt this 
new approach. 
One reason for sticking with the axioms is that, when they are presented to 
subjects in transparent form, they are less likely to be violated than when they 
are not made explicit (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). One view of the experi­
ments showing violations of rationality is that they are designed to study our 
customary intuitions and decision habits to gain insight into how people think 
but that the underlying structure of the tasks is sometimes not obvious, even 
tricky. Tversky's (1969) subjects, for example, vigorously proclaimed that 
they neither violated nor wanted to violate transitivity, although they did make 
intransitive choices. It is possible that, if the public were to apply as much 
careful thought to, say, Allais's paradox as did Savage (1972, 101-3), they, 
like he, might end in accepting the sure-thing principle despite strong initial 
intuitions against it. 
It might be wrong to be too optimistic, however, about the public's eventual 
acceptance of the axioms. People may ascribe, instead, to Samuelson's (1950) 
suggestion that they should "satisfy their preferences and let the axioms sat­
isfy themselves." For example, Lichtenstein interviewed some preference re­
versal subjects extensively (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). One subject, when 
he came to understand that the pattern of his responses could be used as a 
money pump against him, readily agreed to change those responses to make 
them consistent. But he then plaintively noted that he had been instructed, at 
the outset, to report his true preferences; he still felt that his original responses 
were faithful to that instruction. And the majority of Slovic and Tversky's
(1974) subjects were unconvinced by Savage's analysis of the Allais problem. 
One or more axioms of utility theory are violated whenever choices are 
made on the basis of the avoidance of ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961). Ambiguity 
and vagueness about probabilities, even when expressed as second-order 
probabilities, are formally irrelevant in decision analysis but seem to play a 
large role in personal beliefs. There is also increasing evidence that the avoid-
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ance of ambiguity is affecting public policy. For example, insurers are unwill­
ing to cover chemical and waste-processing firms because it is so difficult to 
specify the distribution of anticipated claims (Kunreuther 1987). Einh�rn and
Hogarth (1987) have suggested that ambiguity aversion may explain why 
some technologies are feared more than their first-order probabilities of failure 
or accident warrant. 
Dislike of ambiguity may be a pure preference, like the preference for a 
"fair" coin over a coin biased in some unknown way. However, it is possible 
that what appears to be an aversion to ambiguity really represents other con­
cerns. For example, the public may legitimately recognize that the experts 
have been wrong before-while being highly confident in their wrong beliefs 
(Henrion and Fischhoff 1986). Thus, the public might quite rightly trust prob­
abilities based on abundant data more than probabilities assessed by experts 
lacking such evidence. It would be appropriate for the SDM to include such 
concerns in the analysis, perhaps by finding some attribute, such as dread or 
worry, that could serve as a proxy variable for ambiguity. Researchers could 
help SDMs in this arena by learning more about the structure and correlates of 
ambiguity aversion. 
The jury is still out on the public's eventual acceptance of the axioms of 
decision theory. But we have a more personal reason for suggesting that 
SDMs stick to the axioms. We find that, even when we are comfortable with 
our own violations, we want to hold our SDMs to a higher standard of rational 
thought. Consider, for example, the theory proposed by Loomes and Sugden 
(1982), in which transitivity is given up to accommodate feelings of regret. I_n
our own lives, we may make decisions in a way that minimizes regret even if 
so doing violates transitivity; we might even believe that this is a good thing 
for us to do. But we do not feel an equivalent need to protect our SDMs from 
regret in the decisions that they make on our behalf. We, not they, must suffer 
the consequences, so to hell with their tender feelings. As another example, 
the SDM might be tempted to prefer options with low ambiguity because a 
decision made on that basis can be more easily justified and defended to the 
public (Curley, Yates, and Abrams 1986). We urge our SDM t? resis� th_is
temptation and make the best decision without regard for later d1fficult1es m 
justifying it. 
In summary, we are inclined to believe that the SDM should stick to the 
axioms, but we acknowledge that our case for doing so is not strong. Perhaps 
our best defense of the axioms is a pragmatic one. The SDM who accepts the 
axioms can get on with analyzing the problem at hand, comforted by the cen­
tral theorem of decision theory, which states that, when the axioms are ac­
cepted, utilities can be measured. 
What Risk Attitude Should the SDM Adopt? 
Consider a decision situation with one or more attributes having clear, ex­
plicit numeraires, such as lives or money. There is plenty of evidence that 
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people's utility curves for such attributes are often risk averse in the domain of
gains and risk seeking for losses. Sometimes risk attitudes may apparently re­
verse with a different response-elicitation method (Hershey and Schoemaker
1985) or a different wording (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). But we suspect
that risk attitudes cannot be attributed solely to response biases; our prefer­
ence for a sure outcome of, say, $50 over a 50-50 gamble paying either $200
or -$100 is likely echoed in the preferences of many.
The SDM might want to choose a utility function that has the follow­
ing characteristics: bad outcomes are minimized, catastrophic outcomes are
avoided, and the risk of harm is spread equitably among the affected people.
Keeney ( 1980) has explicated the form of a utility function that has each of
these characteristics. 
Keeney started with n individuals, some or all of whom are at risk of death.
If the risk of death to any one individual is independent of the risk to any
other, the whole situation can be represented by a vector of probabilities (p 1, 
P2, ... , P n) showing the probability, p;, of death for each individual (more
complex lotteries are used to show dependent risks).
These characterizations of risky situations can then be translated into a
probability distribution of total number of fatalities, x. If all the deaths are
equally bad, the central question is to find the appropriate utility function over
x, the number of fatalities. Keeney explores three possibilities.
1. A risk-neutral utility function is the only function that will minimize
expected fatalities. 
2. A risk-prone utility function is the only function that is consistent with a
preference for risk equity. Keeney defines risk equity as a preference for
(p 1, · · · , P;, · · · , P1, · · · , p,,)
over 
(p I, . . .  , P; + e, ... , PJ - e, ... , Pn)
when the difference between P; and p1 is less than the difference between
P; + e and PJ - e. It follows that the most equitable vector of probabilities is
the one in which all the p's are equal. That is, a preference for risk equity is a
preference for equally spread risk. 
3. A risk-averse utility function is the only function that is consistent with
a preference for catastrophe avoidance, defined as a preference for probability
7T of x fatalities over a probability 7T' of x' fatalities for any x < x' such that
7TX = 7T'X'. 
One can, thus, achieve only one of the apparently laudable but inconsistent
goals of fatality minimization, risk equity, and catastrophe avoidance. Which
one should the SDM adopt? We advocate an extreme position, that the SDM
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should always use a risk-neutral utility function for lives-and for money­
for the following reasons. 
The SDM surely realizes that the currently considered risk is only one of 
many. From that perspective, the concept of risk equity gets fuzzy. Is it the 
SDM's goal, under risk equity, to ensure that all citizens of the country have 
an equal risk of dying when all regulated activities are taken into account? 
Short of that absurdity, it is unclear how to choose the number of people and 
the number of different risks over which risk equity should be sought. If risk 
equity is difficult to define, risk proneness loses its appeal. 
As for catastrophe avoidance, we are ethically uncomfortable with the 
position that it is better to avoid 10 deaths from a single accident than to avoid 
one death in each of 10 separate accidents, other things being equal. It seems 
more compelling to us that it is the moral obligation of the SDM to save as 
many lives as possible; that implies risk neutrality. 
Where money is concerned, a broader perspective will reveal that the cur­
rent decision is just one of a multitude of demands for expenditures. Any risk 
attitude other than risk neutrality increases the expected costs and will, in the 
long run, buy us less. Moreover, risk aversion is sometimes motivated by 
fears of a large loss. But a possible loss that would threaten the budget of any 
one individual can be more easily absorbed by the larger budget of a federal 
agency. 
A simplified but not entirely unrealistic conception of many safety deci­
sions is that they involve trade-offs between lives and money. For example, a 
regulatory agency may have a fixed budget with which to research and regu­
late a wide variety of risks to life. Alternatively, the agency may realize that 
there is a limit to the number of different safety regulations that can be im­
posed on a particular risky industry-too many regulations would bankrupt or 
collapse the industry. Here, too, the wish to maximize the number of lives 
saved per dollar spent is consistent only with risk neutrality. 
A catastrophic accident, say 100 deaths and 1,000 injuries in an area popu­
lated by 100,000 persons, would not only engender great suffering and grief 
but also place severe strains on community resources such as hospitals and 
morgues. But these real costs should not be captured by using risk-averse util­
ity functions for death and injury. Instead, they should be included directly as 
additional attributes in the decision analysis. As to the suffering and grief, we 
acknowledge that they might be greater than they would be were such deaths 
and injuries spread out over time and place. But the SDM knows that individ­
ual losses are constantly occuring in numbers greater than this-without ac­
companying newspaper headlines and live television coverage. We believe 
that the SDM should accept the responsibility of preserving life in small 
chunks as well as big chunks; risk neutrality fosters this goal. 
A concept related to risk equity is called benefit/risk equity. This is the 
idea, explored experimentally by Keller and Sarin (1988), that it is fair for 
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those who receive more of the benefits to accept more of the risks. As far as 
we know, this idea is not inconsistent with risk neutrality over number of fa­
talities, as discussed above. 
A further distinction is between the risk to known and unknown lives. We 
do not know how to advise SOMs regarding the relative importance of these 
kinds of deaths. We would not want to live in a culture in which the SOM 
decides not to make a rescue attempt to save a (known) miner now trapped in a 
cave-in because the rescue money would save more (expected but unknown) 
lives if spent tomorrow on mine safety. Here may be a case (not well deline­
ated, we admit) in which the SOM should depart from the prescriptions of 
decision analysis. We fear a possible result of slavish obedience to the analy­
sis: a host of coldhearted regulators disregarding feelings and emotions. 
Which Concerns Should Be Included in the Analysis? 
We believe that all the attributes that are important to the affected people 
should be included in the analysis (assuming that the decision is sensitive to 
those attributes). However, we see some exceptions to this rule. 
Attributes that are illegal or for which there is a clear societal consensus of 
moral objection should be excluded. For example, residents of a community 
may be opposed to a federally funded building project because they fear that 
racially mixed construction and operations crews would settle in their area. 
Such prejudice has been rejected by our society at large and thus should not be 
given formal standing in the evaluation process. 
Other concerns, while valid, may fall outside the SOM's mandate. For ex­
ample, an SOM charged with making decisions about safety regulations for an 
existing nuclear reactor should not consider whether the country is becoming 
too reliant on nuclear power. In this case, the proposed attribute lies outside 
the bounds of the legislation that grants authority to the SOM; it is a broad 
social issue that should be played out in some other arena (probably Congress). 
A special case of an attribute that may have to be disregarded by the SOM 
is "not in my backyard," the syndrome whereby each community simultane­
ously acknowledges the need for a risky facility but refuses to serve as its 
host. One approach in such cases is for the SOM to emphasize the costs 
of noncooperation while offering rewards for cooperation (Kunreuther and 
Kleindorfer 1986). If no community comes through with an acceptance, then 
the SOM may need to override the narrowly focused interests of any single 
community in order to serve the broader interests of the region as a whole. 
What If People Are Misinformed? 
People may disagree with the SOM because they are misinformed about 
some aspect of a decision. The obvious solution, to inform them, is attractive 
if it works, but sometimes that may not be feasible. 
Communicating the facts may be impossible if the facts are highly complex 
and technical. For example, scientists are beginning to understand the com-
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plex chain of events linking exposure to low-frequency electromagnetic fields 
(e.g., from electric blankets or can openers) and potentially dangerous changes 
in human cell structures (Morgan et al. 1987). Without extensive training in 
areas such as chemistry and cell biology, however, people may be incapable 
of understanding the risks involved. Thus, resentment may result if the scien­
tists end up saying, "Just take our word for it, folks, this is a risk that should 
be reduced." 
In addition, people may not trust the SOM or the agency represented by the 
SOM. Thus, whatever they are told is viewed as a probable lie and heavily 
discounted. In such cases, assurances of trustworthiness are likely to fall on 
deaf ears. We can suggest that such an agency first eliminate any real causes 
for distrust and then embark on a long-term strategy of reassurance. But that 
will not help the SOM in the immediate situation. We know of no remedy for 
this problem. 
People are not very good intuitive scientists. Their views of facts and 
of possibilities may be inappropriately influenced by cognitive biases and 
heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982), leading them to a mistaken 
view of the world. Moreover, such effects can be highly resistant to change 
(Fischhoff 1982). 
Of course, experts and the SOM are also subject to the influence of 
cognitive biases and heuristics. That is one good reason for using a formal 
decision-aiding technique like decision analysis. It is far more difficult to dis­
regard relevant base-rate information when one is reminded of it by Bayes 's 
theorem. Similarly, SOMs, like other people, may fail to appreciate the bur­
geoning growth of exponential functions (Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975). But 
statisticians (or hand-held calculators) can remedy this failing. 
In keeping with our insistence, in this chapter, of holding the SOM to the 
most difficult case, let us suppose that a vivid, dramatic, but minor accident 
has artificially elevated (via the availability heuristic) the public's assessment 
of the probability of disaster for liquid natural gas storage facilities. The acci­
dent and resulting change in public views comes just as the SOM is about to 
issue a new safety regulation governing liquid natural gas storage. The public 
demands stringency. The experts have studied the situation extensively and 
have assured the SOM that the regulation need not be as severe as the public 
demands; the SOM believes the experts' analysis. Newspaper coverage and 
pubic hearings fail to change the public's beliefs. Let us not suppose that the 
SOM can say, "Well, it's only money," and issue the stronger regulation. In­
stead, suppose that the stronger regulation, because of its greater cost, will 
prevent the implementation of an additional forthcoming safety regulation, 
one that is expected to save many lives. 
What should the SOM do? A dyed-in-the-wool decision analyst may argue 
that the only thing to do is to analyze this larger problem, looking at both 
regulations and including such attributes as the effects of the anger and mis-
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trust engendered if the SDM goes against public opinion. This seems sensible, 
if perhaps prohibitively expensive. But is it really ethical to incorporate, into 
one's decisions, the public's wrongheadedness? We are not sure. 
It is not only facts and possibilities that the public may be misinformed 
about. They may also be misinformed as to what risk-reduction policies can 
accomplish. Although specific risks can be reduced, at some cost, Keeney 
(1988) has noted that the possibility of zero risk is an illusion. Strictly speak­
ing, risk cannot be eliminated; it can only be transferred or delayed. The con­
trary view, that perfect safety is an attainable goal, can be a source of conflict 
between the SDM and the affected group, one which the SDM may have little 
ability to change. Again, we are left with an unanswered question. Is it right 
for SDMs to alter their decisions in order to appear to be pursuing the illusion 
of perfect safety? 
What If Individual and Societal Perspectives Differ? 
In many cases, both the societal and the individual perspective are valid; 
both can be included in the analysis. Okrent (1987), for example, proposed 
standards for nuclear power that place separate limits on the risk to whole 
populations and the risk to any one individual. But what about seat belts? The 
SDM sees that the costs and consequences of auto accidents extend beyond 
the immediate victims. Moreover, requiring seat-belt usage nationwide would 
save hundreds of lives annually. Such savings would likely outweigh the in­
convenience of wearing seat belts and may even outweigh the loss of personal 
freedom entailed by a national law. Should the SDM also include in the analy­
sis the fact that, from an individual perspective, the risk of a fatal accident 
seems too small to warrant protective action? 
Do People Really Want What They Say They Want? 
The best way to discover the preferences of the affected group is to ask; 
answers are generally forthcoming to questions about values. But do people 
really want what they say they want? Should assertions of preference always 
be taken at face value? 
These are difficult questions on ethical as well as technical grounds. Cer­
tainly, it is dangerous to say that a decision maker might know better than 
someone else what that person really wants; we are rightfully suspicious of 
people disregarding our wishes "for our own good." Nevertheless, we ex­
plore below several skeptical cautions. 
First, people's willingness to answer the questions we researchers put to 
them does not always ensure that they are expressing well-understood and 
deeply held values, particularly when the questions concern a rare and emo­
tionally laden event. Consider, for example, a patient facing the choice of a 
radical mastectomy. There may be no way for her to understand the multi­
plicity of pain, psychological distress, and physical impairment that results 
from such surgery. How bad is it, really, to be permanently unable to lift one's 
arm above one's shoulder? We who can do that now do not know. 
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Second, the way a question is worded can affect the answer. Difficulties 
may arise especially with emotionally laden terms. With such terms, people 
may be so impelled by symbolic meanings that they are blinded to differences 
in how others are using the term. For example, compensation may mean brib­
ery to some people; this connotation leads them to different values than if the 
same concept were thought of as fair payment. 
Other examples of the effect of question framing are myriad (Hogarth 
1982). The most troubling ones are those for which it cannot be said that fur­
ther reflection will reveal the true preference. Some of these involve risk aver­
sion (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Hershey and Schoemaker 1985); we 
have argued above that, in these cases, the SDM should take neither frame, 
using risk neutrality instead. Other examples cannot be so easily resolved. For 
example, McNeil et al. (1982) showed that formally equivalent but different 
ways of presenting information about the probability distribution, over time, 
of death from a particular kind of cancer led both doctors and patients to have 
different preferences for surgery versus radiation treatment. Yet neither de­
scription can be viewed as a more natural or "correct" way to present proba­
bilistic information than the other. 
Third, it is sometimes problematic for a researcher to detect, accurately, 
the variable that the respondents were attending to. A discouraging cautionary 
tale has been told by Wagenaar, Keren, and Lichtenstein (1988). They repli­
cated an experiment by Hammerton, Jones-Lee, and Abbott (1982) in which 
respondents were given a cover story involving an infectious disease on an 
island with 100 residents and a choice between one of the islanders dying for 
sure versus each islander having a 1 in 100 chance of dying. Hammerton, 
Jones-Lee, and Abbott reported that a large majority of subjects preferred the 
one sure death, which they interpreted as evidence of risk aversion. Wage­
naar, Keren, and Lichtenstein found significant differences with apparently 
minor changes of wording. More disturbing, they found enormous differences 
when the cover story was changed to one concerning children who had been 
taken hostage by terrorists (while the underlying structure of the choice re­
mained the same). Respondents then overwhelmingly chose the risk-equitable 
option (in which each child has a 1 in 100 chance of dying while in hostage). 
It became clear (after running 1,366 subjects and 11 story variations) that, 
whatever it was that the subjects were reacting to, it was not the conflict be­
tween risk aversion and risk equity. In the face of these results, SDMs seeking 
guidance on people's preferences should be cautious in generalizing from the 
research literature. 
Finally, expressed preferences are cheap, but are people willing to put their 
money where their mouths are? It does not necessarily follow that, ifl say that 
I prefer coffee over tea, I will order coffee when it costs twice as much as tea. 
The risk-perception literature has delineated several attributes (e.g., catastro­
phe avoidance) that people rely on when describing activities or technologies 
as risky and when judging the need for risk reduction. SDMs could make use 
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from such surgery. How bad is it, really, to be permanently unable to lift one's 
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of this information by incorporating these attributes into their analyses. But
doing so means that attaining a more desired state on one of these attributes
will, usually, entail giving up a bit of some other attribute, perhaps money or
lives. It is critically important to examine people's willingness to make such
trade-offs. Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1984) explored the impor­
tance of catastrophe avoidance relative to lives lost. Their subjects were asked
to choose one of two possible safety measures for a factory. One would reduce
the incidence of single-fatality accidents, thereby saving about 30 lives a year.
The other would reduce the probability of a multiple-fatality accident (or, in
another form, the number of lives lost thereby), thus reducing the expected
lives lost by 27 per year. A substantial proportion of the subjects chose the
former, suggesting that they did not view catastrophe avoidance as more im­
portant than saving three lives. This suggestion needs more direct confirma­
tion. SDMs should be hesitant to incorporate the public's strongly felt desires
until the public is asked to put their money where their mouths are.
CONCLUSIONS 
Our purpose in writing this chapter is to encourage others to join us in
thinking about the ethical problems faced by SDMs in making decisions when
their views differ from those of the affected public. We feel compassion for
the SDM, struggling to do the right thing in difficult circumstances. We want
our SDM to be intellectually well armed with an understanding of decision
analysis sufficient to ensure that complex social problems can be viewed from
a broad, consistent perspective. We also want our SDM to have a backbone,
able to go against (while never ignoring) public desires, and a heart, caring for
and respecting (but not always acquiescing to) public views.
This is a tall order, we admit. These are tough problems, unavoidably so.
We recognize that the world of laboratory experiments, which is at the root of
both behavioral decision theory and risk perception, is a far safer and simpler
place than the world faced by SDMs. Yet we also believe that the link between
experimental and policy settings is strong.
In an important sense, what the SDM knows has got to be enough; the
problems do not allow the luxury of indecision. But neither do they permit
complacency; as students of decision making, we are able to tell SDMs far
less than they would like to know. One implication is that more research is
needed, research about the consequences of SDMs' actions as well as about
what people want their SD Ms to do. Another implication is that decision theo­
rists should be encouraged to seek out real-world decision-making settings, as
rich sources of inspiration and as challenging settings to explore the validity
of laboratory-based findings. Finally, we need to learn more about the ethical
bases for decision making so that SDMs can feel more secure in knowing
when to lead, when to follow, and when to punt.
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5 
Decomposition and the 
Control of Error in 
Decision-Analytic Mode ls 
D ON N. KLEINMUN TZ 
Decision-analytic models rely on the general principle of problem decomposi­
tion: large and complex decision problems are reduced to a set of relatively 
simple judgments, and these component judgments are then combined using 
mathematical rules derived from normative theory. This chapter discusses the 
value of decomposition as a procedure for improving the consistency of deci­
sion making. Various definitions of error and consistency are discussed. 
Linear decomposition models are argued to be particularly useful for the con­
trol of random response errors in the component judgments. Implications for 
decision-analysis research and practice are considered, and decision makers' 
evaluations of the costs and benefits of decision analysis are discussed. 
ONE OF THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS of decision research is the con­
tinuing interaction between descriptive and normative theories of judgment 
and choice. Historically, this involved a one-sided exchange in which the nor­
mative theory was taken as a given-intuitive responses were compared 
to normative standards of optimality or rationality and, often, found to be 
deficient (Edwards 1961; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky 1982; Rapoport and Wallsten 1972; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichten­
stein 1977). More recently, the exchange of ideas has become a dialogue. For 
instance, both psychologists and economists have raised important questions 
about the descriptive validity of rationality assumptions in economic theory 
(Hogarth and Reder 1987; Simon 1978). Another recent development has 
been the use of the results of descriptive studies of decision making to guide 
attempts to reformulate the axiomatic foundations of utility theory (Bell and 
Farquhar 1986; Fishburn, 1982, 1988; Machina 1987). 
One area that blends normative logic with descriptive insight is the set of 
techniques known as decision analysis. These techniques represent an engi­
neering approach to decision making, drawing on both normative and descrip-
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